From NEI’s Japan Earthquake launch page: UPDATE AS OF 11 A.M. EDT, THURSDAY, APRIL 14: To help keep radioactive water from diffusing into the ocean near the plant, TEPCO has installed an underwater silt fence in front of the intake screen for reactors 3 and 4. Radioactive water that has accumulated in turbine room basements is interfering with work to restore cooling operations at the site. TEPCO is completing preparations to transfer the contaminated water to the plant's radioactive water processing facility and other temporary storage locations. TEPCO continues to inject cooling water into reactors 1, 2 and 3 and to spray water as needed into the used fuel pools for reactors 1-4. TEPCO also continues injection of nitrogen gas into the containment vessel of reactor 1 to prevent the potential for an explosion of hydrogen that may be accumulating inside. Workers continued Thursday to move emergency diesel generators to higher ground to keep them safe from aftershocks and tsunamis, the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum reported. An aftershock on Monday briefly disrupted electric power at the Daiichi plant, and a series of aftershocks has rattled the plant several times this week, causing no further damage. TEPCO also is rewiring the external power lines to avoid a total blackout. |
Below is from our rapid response team . Yesterday, regional anti-nuclear organizations asked federal nuclear energy regulators to launch an investigation into what it claims are “newly identified flaws” in Westinghouse’s advanced reactor design, the AP1000. During a teleconference releasing a report on the subject, participants urged the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to suspend license reviews of proposed AP1000 reactors. In its news release, even the groups making these allegations provide conflicting information on its findings. In one instance, the groups cite “dozens of corrosion holes” at reactor vessels and in another says that eight holes have been documented. In all cases, there is another containment mechanism that would provide a barrier to radiation release. Below, we examine why these claims are unwarranted and why the AP1000 design certification process should continue as designated by the NRC. Myth: In the AP1000 reactor design, the gap between the shield bu...
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