NEI Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Marvin Fertel just testified before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations. Here is an overview of what he had to say:
Technorati tags: Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Power, Environment, Energy, Politics, Technology, Economics, Safety, Security, Nuclear Plants
Growing electricity demand and concern over energy security and climate change has led to a resurgence of interest in nuclear energy. The Energy Policy Act of 2005, signed into law by President Bush and passed with broad bipartisan support in both branches of Congress, has added to an already increasing interest in the construction of new nuclear plants.Visit NEI's Web site to read the written testimony.
Clearly, the nation’s nuclear power plants are more secure today than they were before the Sept. 11 terrorists attacks. America’s commercial nuclear power plants have long been considered the most secure facilities in our nation’s critical infrastructure. Since 2001, the nuclear energy industry has made these facilities even more secure. Over the past four years, the NRC elevated nuclear facility security requirements numerous times by issuing orders and other formal requirements, and the agency is in the process of codifying additional requirements in rulemakings. The industry has invested more than $1.2 billion in security improvements at nuclear plant sites and has increased the number of specially trained, well-armed security forces by more than 60 percent.
Since I last testified before this subcommittee in 2004, the industry has taken these broad actions to enhance security for our workers and our neighbors in the communities in which we operate nuclear power plants:
• implemented NRC-approved security plans for each nuclear power plant
• completed physical security improvements required by the NRC
• conducted hundreds of force-on-force security exercises at 64 plants, including NRC-observed and -supervised force-on-force drills at 24 plant sites
• implementing enhanced security provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, in coordination with the NRC
• completed more than 20 Department of Homeland Security comprehensive reviews of nuclear power plants.
The nuclear energy industry recognizes that the spectrum of possible threats facing a nation can be larger than the design basis threat for a nuclear power plant. The design basis threat (DBT) defines the abilities of a potential attacking force against which the industry’s security strategy must succeed. The industry has been a private-sector leader, working under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security, to assess a broader spectrum of threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure. These assessments will help DHS decide how best to allocate federal and state resources to supplement private security forces at each plant site. Security at nuclear power plants provides a solid basis from which this more integrated federal, state, local and private response can be built. When the NRC elevated the DBT for nuclear power plants, it appropriately considered both the threats facing our nation, and the policy, legal and practical limitations on a private entity in facing these threats.
Technorati tags: Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Power, Environment, Energy, Politics, Technology, Economics, Safety, Security, Nuclear Plants
Comments
The GAO and Congressman Shays concluded that by all appearances the Commission based its decisions to downsize security regulations on industry financial concerns.
I have no dispute with you et al that US chemical facilities are vulnerable and to the same weaponry that was dropped from NRC's revised DBT as disclosed by GAO.
That said, the 911 Commission Report is explicit in stating that the original target sets for al Qaeda included two nuclear power stations along with WTC, Pentagon, the Captiol, White House and tallest building on West Coast.
So your attempt to deflect the identified target value of nuclear power stations is baseless.
RPGs are widely available on the black market and in use against us in Irag and Afghanistan, today. The testimony of the GAO revealed that RPGs are very easily smuggled into the US. The 50 caliber rifles are legally available and can be loaded with armor piercing ammunition.
NRC staff recommendations to include these weapons in with the revised DBT adversary characteristics was amply supported by US intelligence.
The reason that the Commission dropped these weapons as well as downsized potential truck bombs from the DBT is because NEI whined about how expensive it would be to protect against.
It was also explained at the hearing that in fact projectile nets are not even that big of an expense.
But apparently NEI views it as the slippery slope of the rising capital costs of security posed by the reality of global arms trade today.
Some of those chickens from US support of jihad against the Soviets apparently coming home to roost, potentially including TOW missiles ala Ollie North's Iran-Contra arms deals. Mow there's a "patriot" for you.
The industry is unwilling to bear the full cost of upgrading security around target rich nuclear power stations.
Industry and its federal promoters should not be allowed to build new nuclear power stations in light of the unreasonable costs of guarding nuclear power from catastrophy.
Distributed renewable energy generation is how we hardened our national energy policy.
No Nukes / Go Solar
How clearly you reveal your real purpose. I'm actually quite surprised, since you tend to play your hand a little closer to the chest -- pretending to care about issues such as security and safety, when to you they are only a means to an end.
It should be obvious to anyone reading your last comment what your real game is: to use fear to drive up the cost of nuclear power to the point that it becomes uneconomical, regardless of practical considerations and regardless of any relative comparison of level of threat versus level of security (irrational fear does not need to consider any of these things). That is your sole purpose, and as such, I cannot see how you and NIRS have anything of value to add to this discussion, since nothing that is done will ever be enough to satisfy you until your real goal is met -- which is not security and safety.
For example, you freely bring up that "the 911 Commission Report is explicit in stating that the original target sets for al Qaeda included two nuclear power stations along with WTC, Pentagon, ..." (I don't know where you get the number two from, but that is beside the point). Sounds very scary, but to be fair, you fail to mention that, in every place that the report mentions plans to target a nuclear plant, these plans are always dismissed by the terrorists as being impractical or too difficult -- and this is before security at these plants was enhanced after 9/11. Thus, all I can conclude is that your rhetoric is simply a collection of smoke and mirrors, designed to frighten, confuse, and mislead, but certainly not grounded in what we know or what is realistic.