Below is from our rapid response team . Yesterday, regional anti-nuclear organizations asked federal nuclear energy regulators to launch an investigation into what it claims are “newly identified flaws” in Westinghouse’s advanced reactor design, the AP1000. During a teleconference releasing a report on the subject, participants urged the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to suspend license reviews of proposed AP1000 reactors. In its news release, even the groups making these allegations provide conflicting information on its findings. In one instance, the groups cite “dozens of corrosion holes” at reactor vessels and in another says that eight holes have been documented. In all cases, there is another containment mechanism that would provide a barrier to radiation release. Below, we examine why these claims are unwarranted and why the AP1000 design certification process should continue as designated by the NRC. Myth: In the AP1000 reactor design, the gap between the shield bu...
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This design modification, which was done a few decades back, has been communicated at our website and in other places, sometimes folks miss it.
Thanks.
It is nothing but fluff. All it does is instruct plants to review their procedures and check readiness of equipment.
Something they should be doing on a regular, routine basis.
Why INPO should be writing a SER four days after the incident, not knowing the scope of the problems is mystifying to me.
I spent two years with INPO in the mid 1980 and participated in writing these documents.
We had an hydrogen gas excursion 10 hours following turbine trip at TMI. This was caused by the oxidation of approximately 30% of the zirconium fuel cladding.
The gases escaping through a pressurizer relief valve into the containment building.
Ignition of the gas most likely occurred during the remote cycling of one of these valves.
The maximum pressure to which the building experienced was 28 psig.
These containment buildings were designed for a pressure of about 60 psig, but structurally, should remain intact at twice that pressure.
It was about four days after the accident when our Industry Advisory Group received the Reactor Building pressure strip chart at breakfast and we became aware of it. Although, this information was available on the main control room console, it was not generally known to others.