You know, it’s kind of sad that no one is willing to invest in nuclear energy anymore. Wait, what? NuScale Power celebrated the news of its company-saving $30 million investment from Fluor Corp. Thursday morning with a press conference in Washington, D.C. Fluor is a design, engineering and construction company involved with some 20 plants in the 70s and 80s, but it has not held interest in a nuclear energy company until now. Fluor, which has deep roots in the nuclear industry, is betting big on small-scale nuclear energy with its NuScale investment. "It's become a serious contender in the last decade or so," John Hopkins, [Fluor’s group president in charge of new ventures], said. And that brings us to NuScale, which had run into some dark days – maybe not as dark as, say, Solyndra, but dire enough : Earlier this year, the Securities Exchange Commission filed an action against NuScale's lead investor, The Michael Kenwood Group. The firm "misap
Comments
This design modification, which was done a few decades back, has been communicated at our website and in other places, sometimes folks miss it.
Thanks.
It is nothing but fluff. All it does is instruct plants to review their procedures and check readiness of equipment.
Something they should be doing on a regular, routine basis.
Why INPO should be writing a SER four days after the incident, not knowing the scope of the problems is mystifying to me.
I spent two years with INPO in the mid 1980 and participated in writing these documents.
We had an hydrogen gas excursion 10 hours following turbine trip at TMI. This was caused by the oxidation of approximately 30% of the zirconium fuel cladding.
The gases escaping through a pressurizer relief valve into the containment building.
Ignition of the gas most likely occurred during the remote cycling of one of these valves.
The maximum pressure to which the building experienced was 28 psig.
These containment buildings were designed for a pressure of about 60 psig, but structurally, should remain intact at twice that pressure.
It was about four days after the accident when our Industry Advisory Group received the Reactor Building pressure strip chart at breakfast and we became aware of it. Although, this information was available on the main control room console, it was not generally known to others.